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Turkey as an Emerging Power:
An analysis of its Role in Global and Regional Security
Governance Constellations

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EUI Working Paper **RSCAS2014/52**

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Abstract

Since 2007, there seems to be a re-shuffling of economic and political strength between the great powers of the previous period and the challengers, altering the global landscape. One such player aspiring to be one of the new global powers is Turkey. This does not seem a far fetched goal given Turkey's impressive economic clout, as the 15th largest economy in the world, its military capabilities and its geostrategic position. This paper proposes that even though, China, India, Russia, Brazil are counted upon as the main challengers to international status, Turkey acquired a new position within this group of newly emerging global players. This paper investigates whether Turkey has become one of the key actors in reshaping global dynamics, and if so what kind of an impact it would have on global and regional balances of power.

Keywords

Turkey, global governance, emerging power, regional constellations

Introduction

Increasing visibility of emerging powers in international relations is currently seen as a challenge to more traditional powers (Kirchner and Dominquez, 2011; Fontaine and Kilman, 2013). The re-shuffling of economic and political strength between the great powers of the previous period and the challengers seem to alter the global landscape. One such player aspiring to be one of the new global powers is Turkey. This does not seem a far fetched goal given Turkey's impressive economic clout-though slowing down in 2013, its political capabilities and its geostrategic position. Even though, China, India, Russia, Brazil are counted upon as the main challengers to international status quo, Turkey also seems to acquire a new position within this group of newly emerging global players. This leads us to question whether Turkey has become one of the key actors in reshaping global dynamics, and if so what kind of an impact it would have on global and regional balances of power. This paper tries to address precisely this question.

When an informed observer looks at Turkey, he/she might note that substantial changes seem to be taking place since 2002. Turkey is ruled with a majoritarian government, re-elected in 2011 with 50% of the votes (Muftuler-Bac and Keyman, 2012), and its GDP almost reaches 1, 4 trillion \$ in purchasing power parity terms, with a steady and sustainable economic growth rate. Its political appeal has increased in the Middle East, especially with regards to its ability to reconcile democratic values with an Islamic tradition. A specific question in regional security governance is whether emerging powers strengthen the role of regional security governance, seek limited intergovernmentalism or mold these regional security arrangements in line with their own material, national interests. Accordingly, this paper seeks an answer as to what Turkish preferences might be with regards to regional security governance as well as the extent to which Turkey contributes to regional and collective security governance.

In the recent years, Turkey has been following a pro-active foreign policy both globally and regionally, highly visible with its role in international institutions such as the United Nations and G-20, as well as its stance on the events in the Middle East. This increased visibility, however, does not always follow a pro-Western position as it would have been expected given Turkey's membership in NATO and its traditionally pro-American policy choices. For example, despite the American opposition, the Turkish government signed an multi-million dollar energy deal with Iran in November 2009, voted against sanctions to Iran in the UN Security Council in 2010, started a new military cooperation scheme with Syria and lifted its visa requirements in 2010, cancelled its military exercises with Israel and openly sided with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 2012 and 2013. Clearly, Turkey began to play a different role in regional security governance and it is the purpose of this paper to assess this role in such global and regional security governance constellations. Particularly important in this analysis is the evaluation of Turkey's regional power status through the application of the four main security dimensions; prevention, protection, assurance and compellance. This paper addresses first Turkey's increasing visibility in international politics as an emerging regional player by an analysis of its capabilities- military, economic and political, and second, assesses its emerging power status by an investigation of its activities under these four dimensions.

Turkey as an emerging power

Turkey is one of the few countries in the world which has significant impact on global security and regional security arrangements. It is geographically located both in Europe and in the Middle East, but politically it is part of the European order. Turkey became an integral part of the European system of states in the aftermath of World War II as it became a member of the Council of Europe in 1948, the Organization for Economic Cooperation in 1949, NATO in 1952 and an associate member of the then European Community in 1963. Turkey became a candidate country for EU membership in 1999 and

began its accession talks on October 3, 2005. All throughout the Cold War years, Turkey followed a pro-American foreign policy and acted as an anchor for NATO in Southeast Europe. However, Turkey's role in international security began to change in the post-Cold War period, with an increased presence in regional security issues.

Since 2007, Turkey has been following a foreign policy of good neighborly relations, with diplomatic engagement and expansion of economic and cultural ties with its neighbours. Some of these initiatives are blatantly different than the foreign policy choices of the European Union and the USA (Muftuler-Bac, 2011; Keyman, 2009). This is coupled with a more vocal Turkey in international politics (Benli Altunisik, 2009; Aras and Fidan, 2009; Keyman, 2009), both in terms of its capabilities and in terms of its public diplomacy. This is an unexpected development for Turkish foreign policy, given that Turkey's foreign policy in the post World War II period was centered on its ties with the USA, its membership in NATO and its place in the European order.

Specifically, the Turkish role in regional governance and international security constellations began to change in the last decade with a number of key developments. First, its economic development, as the 15th largest economy in the world, enabled Turkey to expand its trade and investment links with most of its neighbours, but also beyond the region with engagement in African countries and Far East Asia (Kirişçi, 2009; Kirişçi and Kaptanoğlu, 2011). Turkey has a substantial investment record in the Arab countries, ranking it first in Iraq for example. Second, the changes in Turkish foreign policy made a significant impact as its EU candidacy presented a role model (Muftuler-Bac, 2011) that could form an inspiration, especially among other countries with predominantly Muslim populations. This new Turkish role in the Middle East region would be particularly important given the recent restructuring in the Arab world (Keyman, 2013). Turkey's increased reliance on trade and aid flows as well as its enhanced political visibility in the region could be seen as indicators of its prevention role, a critical aspect of the emerging powers' contribution to regional and global security governance. However, prevention is only one aspect of the evaluation of countries' regional power status. For an aspiring regional power such as Turkey, its ability to protect, assure and compel are critical in projecting such power. This is also why, whether Turkey could act as a regional player and fulfill its aspirations to become one of the key players in international politics depends largely on its capabilities- military, economic and political. The next section looks at these capabilities to assess Turkey's role in impacting global balance of power as well as its ability to assure, compel, protect and prevent.

The Turkish capabilities: Military, Political and Economic

As an emerging regional power, Turkey relies on its geostrategic position- straddling East and West, military capabilities, its developing democracy and stable economy. First, Turkey's geostrategic position is an essential feature of its emerging power status. Its geographical location has long given Turkey a strong place within the Western alliance, but in the newly emerging international order, this location has become even more critical. It borders one of the most volatile regions in the world, the Middle East and is situated in the epicentre of trade and energy routes. It shares maritime boundaries with Russia and Ukraine. This geographic location makes it an indispensable actor in regional conflicts. However, beyond its geostrategic position, Turkey has significant military capabilities at its disposal which further bolsters its emerging power status. These military capabilities are measured by military strength, standing army, fire power, conventional weapons, and other tangible elements of capability, based on which the global firepower index currently ranks Turkey 11th out of 68 countries in total.

Table 1: Turkish military capabilities-Global power index¹

Ranking	Country	Power index
1	United States	0.2475
2	Russia	0.2618
3	China	0.3351
4	India	0.4346
5	United Kingdom	0.5185
6	France	0.6163
7	Germany	0.6491
8	South Korea	0.6547
9	Italy	0.6838
10	Brazil	0.6912
11	Turkey	0.7059
12	Pakistan	0.7331
13	Israel	0.7559
14	Egypt	0.7569

The ranking above plays a critical role, specifically in assessing Turkey's compellence capabilities. A regional power needs to rely on its military strength to project compellence capacity and Turkey's sheer military strength seems to be doing precisely that. Its military spending is also substantial, with 18, 2 billion dollars in 2012 placing Turkey as the 15th highest spender globally in military expenditures. Its relative rank in the global fire power index and sustained military expenditures contribute to Turkey's compellence capacity significantly.

However, sheer military power is insufficient for Turkey to become a regional player as this needs to be bolstered by both economic and political clout. Specifically, an emerging power's capacity to assure depends on its democratic credentials. A significant aspect of political clout is whether Turkey is perceived as a fully functioning democracy, especially considering the democratic upheaval in the region (Keyman, 2013). The Turkish democratic development has not been an easy feat, with significant interruptions by the military over the past 4 decades but since 2002, there seems to be an increased stability under the AKP rule. The electoral hegemony of the AKP, however, has not led to a fully democratic system in Turkey yet (Muftuler-Bac and Keyman, 2012). The Freedom House rankings in 2013 rank Turkey as partly free, with significant problems in civil liberties.²The rise of political Islam in the region has repercussions for its democratic development (Cagatay, 2007; Keyman, 2013). This is particularly important for Turkey's prevention and assurance capabilities.

¹ Global Firepower calculations, 2013.<http://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp>.

² <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world>

When in Tunisia, Mohammed Bouazizi, a young street vendor, set himself in fire in December 2010 in protest to the political repression and lack of human dignity; he also ignited a process of rapid political upheaval. The Arab Spring began with the demands coming from mostly the middle classes who demanded justice, dignity and participation (Bellin, 2012). This, of course, was not an overnight transformation. Turbulent elections were held in Iraq, Jordan and Egypt in 2010; however it was not until the explosion of civic unrest in Tunisia in December 2010 that these developments turned into a full fledged process of upheaval across the region. The regime transition in the region followed one after another with Egypt, Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, Yemen, Libya and finally Syria. The regime change in Libya took place in February 2011, and since October 2011, a civil uprising and the massive death toll in Syria grabbed the world's attention. This process of socio-political transformation in the Middle East since 2010 led to the collapse of authoritarian governments. Specifically, the old regimes in the Arab world found themselves confronted with demands of justice, freedom and democracy. The common denominator for all is that there seems to be a societal demand for increased political participation and basic liberties (Bellin, 2012; Hollis, 2012). It is within this regional transformation that Turkey found itself at a crossroads. For example, when the popular uprisings began in 2011 in Egypt against the government, the Turkish government immediately called upon the rulers of Egypt to respond to these demands. As a result, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's 'calls for Mubarak to go immediately' have been well-received by the Egyptian activists gathered in Cairo's central Tahrir (Liberation) Square' (Ozerkan, 2011). This also was interesting as Turkey remained relatively silent in the regime transition in Tunisia when Ben Ali stepped down as Tunisia's leader. However, the Egyptian uprisings also saw a more vocal Turkey supporting the democratic developments. It should be noted that in both cases, Turkey's responses remained in the diplomatic realm. When Erdoğan went on a tour of the region in September 2011, his position was shaped by the Turkish emphasis on the diplomatic ties and the protection of democratic values. Interestingly, when he stated: "Do not be wary of secularism. I hope there will be a secular state in Egypt" (Champion and Bradley, 2011) in his interview on Egyptian TV, the Islamists in Egypt did not react favorably to this notion. The declaration, nonetheless, was important in sending signals to the Arab world as to what Turkish government would like to see in the region, democratic states respecting human rights and upholding secular values at the same time. When the Egyptian political transformation took a different turn in summer 2013, the Turkish position in the Egyptian situation complicated Turkey's relations with Egypt. The Turkish role in the Arab transformation and upheavals fits the prevention dimension of regional security governance. To this end, Turkey actively engaged itself in the region's political transformation and mediated between different political factions in these countries, clearly demonstrating its leadership role as well as its ability to prevent a regional security escalation.

A question that begs an answer is whether Turkey could emerge as the main actor in stabilizing the region and assist the process of transformation in the post-Arab Spring period. This could be possible by Turkey's economic and political clout, as Turkey has a secular regime with a democratically functioning government, integrated into the European system with the cohabitation of Islamic values together with Western life styles. This is particularly important given Turkey's relationship with the Arab countries in the past as the Turkish modernization inspired similar transformations in the Middle East, such as the 1955 Egyptian reforms. Accordingly, Davutoğlu summarized the possible Turkish role in the political transformation in the Middle East in his declaration of March 2011 as: "Our responsibility is to open the way for this new generation, and to build a new region over the coming decade that will be specified by the will of its people" (Davutoğlu, 2011).

This, of course, remains a main challenge for the region. These also emerge as key issues for democratic consolidation in Turkey. The AKP government has a unique mix of Islamic support, liberals and conservative nationalists backing it up (Muftuler-Baç and Keyman, 2012); but its practices while in power made certain portions of the Turkish population grow wary of the AKP rule. A case in point is the Gezi protests of June 2013. Thus, Turkey's ability to project its political power rests upon its own democratic consolidation and respect for diversity. Though it can not be compared to the Arab states in the Middle East, Turkey still has its own demons to fight with. Having said this, it is clear that

Turkey plays a preventive role in the region through its active diplomatic, economic and political engagement.

Economic capabilities matter significantly in regional security governance by enhancing an emerging power's prevention capacity-through its foreign aid, as well as its assurance and compellance capacities-by increasing its ability to use monetary means for security gains. This matters significantly for Turkey's emerging power status. The Turkish economy turned out to be one of the success stories of economic development in the last decade when the world seems to suffer from decreased economic activity. When the G-20 was organized in 2003 bringing together the largest 20 economies in the world together in an institutionalized setting, Turkey found itself among key international players as the largest 15th economy in the world, and Turkish policy makers aim to make it one of the largest 10 economies in the world by 2023. Table 2 provides a glimpse into Turkey's relative position in the global economic order.

Table 2: The Largest Economies of the World 2012³

Ranking	Country	GDP-millions of \$ in Purchasing power parity
1	United States	15, 684,000
2	China	12,470,982
3	India	4,793,414
4	Japan	4,490,681
5	Russian Federation	3,380,071
6	Germany	3,307,873
7	Brazil	2,365,779
8	France	2,354, 874
9	United Kingdom	2,264,751
10	Mexico	2,015,281
11	Italy	1,980,574
12	Korea Rep.	1,536,212
13	Canada	1,489,165
14	Spain	1,484,950
15	Turkey	1,306,155
16	Indonesia	1,223,488
17	Australia	1,008,547
18	Poland	844,213
19	Netherlands	719,967

This, in turn, led to Turkey to use tools of economic integration and interdependence in its relations with its neighbours in the Middle East, the Balkans and the Caucasus (Kirişçi, 2009; Kirişçi and Kaptanoğlu, 2011). Turkey's increasing role as an economic powerhouse in the region enabled it to challenge the traditional power balances and rely on its economic capabilities to become a more influential actor in the region. This is reflected in turn in the Turkish trade volume and its standing globally in international trade in Table 3.

³ World Development Indicators, World Bank, 1 July 2013, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP_PPP.pdf.

Table 3: Turkish Trade Volume Statistics, 2013⁴(million dollars)

Ranking	Country	Trade Volume				
		2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
1	Germany	31.639	23.890	29.028	36.936	34.525
2	Russia	37.847	22.640	26.229	29.946	33.306
3	China	17.095	14.277	19.450	24.160	24.128
4	Iran	10.229	5.431	10.689	16.051	21.886
5	USA	16.276	11.816	16.082	20.618	19.735
6	Italy	18.501	13.484	16.645	21.301	19.718
7	France	15.640	13.303	14.231	16.035	14.788
8	United Kingdom	13.418	9.411	11.916	13.992	14.323
9	United Arab Emirates	8.667	3.564	4.031	5.356	11.771
10	Iraq	4.050	5.244	6.190	8.397	10.971
11	Spain	8.595	6.595	8.376	10.114	9.741
12	Netherlands	6.200	4.670	5.617	7.248	6.905
18	Saudi Arabia	3.111	2.544	3.598	4.765	5.848
20	Egypt	2.313	3.241	3.177	4.142	5.021
23	Bulgaria	3.992	2.502	3.200	4.097	4.439
28	Azerbaijan	2.030	1.541	1.803	2.326	2.925
33	Libya	1.411	2.153	2.358	887	2.556
44	Georgia	1.523	1.048	1.060	1.407	1.434
56	Lebanon	844	797	847	1.001	1.022
57	Tunisia	1.143	881	994	1.052	992
60	Jordan	892	845	648	966	860
63	Qatar	1.233	375	340	669	724
67	Serbia	520	362	416	568	586
69	Kuwait	574	395	610	568	569
70	Syria	1.439	1.643	2.297	1.947	565
79	Croatia	434	322	460	553	410
80	Macedonia	326	323	315	391	378
81	Bahrain	404	138	244	272	367
82	Bosnia	597	279	297	359	363
84	Albania	342	278	328	397	355
94	Kosovo	285	288	308	276	264
	Total	333.991	243.071	299.428	375.749	389.007

The size of the Turkish trade volume could be seen as a good indicator of Turkey's global and regional power status, as well as its prevention capabilities. As Table 3 shows Turkey's largest trading partners are primarily from the largest economies in the world with geographic concentration in Europe. However, one needs to note that Iran and Iraq are among Turkey's largest trading partners- making

⁴ Turkish Trade volume statistics

<http://www.ekonomi.gov.tr/upload/1BD6EE84-98A9-105B-265A8DFD3265ACFB/eko07a.xls>

Turkey a critical player for their economic well being. Since increased trade volume is important for enhancing the probability of resolving conflicts with peaceful measures, the increased Turkish presence in global and regional trade could be seen as a good measure of its security role. This adds to the Turkish ability to play a preventive role, for example, when Turkey negotiated with Iran along with Brazil in 2010 for a nuclear swap deal, the Turkish economic and political relations with Iran seems to give credibility to the Turkish position. Similarly, its economic capabilities enabled Turkey to increase its foreign aid to the recipient countries and it gave 2.53 billion \$ in 2012 as foreign aid, with Somalia receiving 77.7 million \$- the largest aid package to this country in 2012. An increased prestige for Turkey in regional politics is also tied to its increased economic ties in the region. Since Turkey's trade flows with countries in the Middle East are steadily increasing, Turkey's ability to influence events in the region is also enhanced. Table 4 looks at this trade volume for Turkey's neighbors.

Table 4: Trade Statistics with the Middle Eastern and Caucasian countries
2011, all figures are in American dollars (million)

Country	Exports	Imports
Iraq	8.314.402.908	86.753.336
United Arab Emirates	3.708.408.445	1.649.450.514
Iran	3.590.525.289	12.461.494.631
Saudi Arabia	2.763.602.247	2.001.483.081
Israel	2.391.221.720	2.057.280.965
Azerbaijan	2.064.944.395	262.077.473
Syria	1.611.156.224	336.646.450
Georgia	1.092.545.667	314.352.211
Lebanon	718.426.670	282.743.800
Jordan	506.968.097	65.530.062
Yemen	272.732.756	464.420
Unman	214.677.365	56.557.903
Kuwait	297.208.448	270.446.054
Qatar	188.220.302	481.016.778
Bahrain	160.436.393	111.453.583
Palestine	49.092.820	271.055
Armenia	218.318	132.765
TOTAL	27.944.788.094	20.438.155.081

Source: Turkish State Institute of Statistics, 2011.

It is clear from the table that the Middle East has become an important market for Turkish exports, by 2012 the volume of trade with the Middle East reached 65 billion \$. There is also an upward trend in the last four years parallel to Turkey's political engagement in the region. Turkey's trade volume with Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia increased. Syria, of course, is another interesting case as there was a steady increase until the end of 2011. A significant finding is that for countries such as Iraq, trade with Turkey is critical. Since 2008, Iraq is the fifth destination for all Turkey's exports, coming right after Germany, France, UK and Italy, but Iraq ranks as the first destination for Turkey's agricultural goods and food exports, around 11.7% of Turkish agricultural exports went to Iraq in 2009, bypassing Germany's share. The economic interactions between Turkey and Iraq has reached such proportions that Iraq is now the fifth largest market for Turkish exports, but more importantly Turkey became

Iraq's largest trading partner, as its trade volume in 2012 exceeded 10 billion dollars. This composition of trade volume is critical, as the share of Turkish exports to Iraq constitute more than 40% of all Iraqi exports giving Turkey significant leverage on Iraqi economy. This is similar to Turkish role in the Balkans, Georgia, and Azerbaijan and also in Syria before the uprisings began. Turkey also has free trade agreements with all the Balkan countries except Kosovo. These all add up to demonstrate Turkey's preventive capabilities.

One needs to note that it is not only trade volume that has changed recently to make Turkey a more visible regional player, but also capital flows. Turkey invests heavily in the Middle East, Caucasus, and the Balkans. Turkey received in total around 13 billion \$ as foreign direct investment in 2012. However, when we look at its own foreign direct investment, by 2012, Turkish contractors only in the Middle East are involved in projects worth around a total of 65.8 billion \$, with 12 billion \$ solely in 2012. Turkey invests in the Middle East by building airports, petroleum refineries and other similar strategic sectors. As for the Balkans, Turkish foreign direct investment has reached 189 million \$ in 2011, with trade reaching around 18, 5 billion \$ in the region. Turkish investment and Development Agency TİKA, established in 1990 invested 4.7 billion \$ in developing countries, mostly in Central Asia and the Middle East making Turkey a visible player in these countries' economies in line with the prevention dimension of Regional security governance.

To turn to the Middle East, Turkey is the 2nd largest investor in Iraq coming right after China. As of May 2013, Turkish contracting activity in Iraq reached 18 billion \$ making Iraq the 4th largest market for Turkish contractors and its FDI in Iraq in 2012 was 94 million\$. This is also similar in other Middle Eastern countries, for example, by 2013 Turkish contractors are involved in projects worth 12,5 billion \$ such as the King Abdallah business centre in Riyadh and Jabal Omar business centre in Mecca. Turkey also actively sends economic aid to Libya to help its reconstruction and has recently invested 500 million dollars in the health sector in Libya. The Turkish companies had heavily invested in Libya prior to the uprising, the Turkish contractors are involved in projects in Libya worth around 28 billion \$ and Turkish FDI in Libya reached 37 billion \$ in 2012, with around 8 billion \$ in the construction sector. When the military operation in Libya was over, Turkey became one of the first countries to recognize the Transitional National Government in Libya in July 2011, and allocated 300 million \$ to help the reconstruction efforts immediately. What is more, in terms of training military personnel and security officers in Libya, Iraq and Afghanistan, Turkey clearly took an initiative. In 2012, the Turkish government provided training for 1,500 Libyans for the police force, engaged actively in the rebuilding of schools and hospitals free of charge and provided significant financial aid and loans. It already had a visa exemption regime with Libya since 2009 and was an active player in Libyan economy prior to the 2011 crisis. Similarly, Turkey provided training for Afghan troops and Iraqi military forces on a constant basis. The Turkish ability to assist financially the security forces in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya as well as its training of these forces provide us with empirical evidence of Turkey's role in RSG within the assurance dimension.

In short, Turkey's economic and political influence in the region where it is located is substantial. It provides a model of democratic development, albeit with some problems of its own but still a functioning democracy with secular values and it has a significant economic power with close ties in its region both in terms of trade and FDI. It remains to be seen whether these capabilities are reflected onto a capacity to influence regional and global security.

Turkey within the regional security governance

In an evaluation of Turkey's role in global and regional security governance schemes, it is possible to see clearly its contribution in all four dimensions; prevention, protection, assurance and compellance. In terms of prevention, Turkey's inclusion into international institutions such as NATO, the Council of Europe, G-20, Organization for Islamic Conference is critical. Turkey's role in global and security governance has largely been tied to its NATO membership since 1952. Its financial aid to the

developing world, the trade volume with its neighbours, nuclear swap deal it tried to negotiate with Iran along with Brazil, its mediation efforts between the Iraqis and Syrians in 2009, between the various political factions in Iraq in 2010 and 2011, between the Serbians and Kosovars in 2009 all fit the prevention dimension. In addition, its welcoming of more than 500,000 refugees from Syria since 2011 is a testimony to its prevention ability. At the global level, Turkey has long been an advocate of a Security Council reform and was very vocal about the necessity to increase the emerging countries' presence in the UNSC to reflect the changing balance of power during its most recent term at the UNSC from 2009 to 2011.

In terms of protection, Turkey actively provides relief and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Georgia since 2006. These efforts involve provincial reconstruction to provide health, education and agricultural services. Turkey hosts multiple international institutions in its territory, the latest of which is the agreement to host the UNDP in Istanbul signed in September 2013. Such regional organizations as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, the South East European cooperative process were launched under Turkish leadership and their main offices are located in Turkey. In 2012, Turkey also deepened its ties with the Shanghai Cooperation organization which accepted Turkey as an official dialogue partner. These all add up to demonstrate Turkey's protection capacity.

As for assurance, one could point out to the setting up of NATO's Partnership for peace training center in Turkey in 1998 and the continuous flow of aid to training of security forces from Turkey to these countries. Second, Turkey's participation in civilian operations held under the EU and NATO such as the EU civilian crisis management in Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as the Turkish participation in UN peace keeping operations such as the 2006 UNIFIL in Lebanon signal Turkey's ability to assure. In addition, the Turkish foreign ministry's regular Diplomacy academies where diplomatic training is provided for developing countries' diplomats free of charge as well as the Turkish armed forces training of security forces in such countries as Iraq and Afghanistan are clear indicators of its assurance role. For example, Turkey contributed to the Afghani security forces both financially and in terms of military assistance. It contributed 1, 5 million euros to the Afghan army and 2 million \$ to the air force, in addition Turkey trained about 3,500 Afghan military personnel. NATO's civilian representative to Afghanistan was a former Turkish foreign minister, Hikmet Cetin and Turkey actively contributed to education and health service activities in Afghanistan. These activities clearly signal Turkey's assurance capabilities.

Compellance ability goes beyond these measures and involves the emerging powers' ability to use force and to project military power. Its compellance ability is further signalled by the level of military spending in Turkey with 18.2 billion \$ in 2012, putting Turkey into the list of largest military spending as the 15th. One could point out to Turkey's participation in EU and NATO led operations since the end of the Cold War as a visible indicator of its regional power status as measured by its compellance ability. First, Turkey contributes on a steady basis to all the NATO operations as well as the EU led operations in its region. Turkey was an active contributor with a substantial force to all the EU led operations held under the CESDP since the 2003 Operation Concordia in Macedonia. Its contribution of 1,650 troops to the EU-led Operation Althea in Bosnia in 2004 was the 2nd highest contribution among all the participants. Furthermore, Turkey's role in NATO's ISAF in Afghanistan indicated a very strong burden sharing where Turkey contributed to ISAF significantly-around 1 800 troops- and assumed command of ISAF several times. Turkey also assumed the Regional Command Capital leadership in 2006 and held in until 2012. In addition, even though the NATO forces are scheduled to withdraw from Afghanistan by 2014, Turkey already declared that it would remain in the country to help the Afghan force in their transition period. This participation in ISAF demonstrates Turkey's compellance abilities. Further proof for Turkey's role in compellance dimension in regional security governance is provided by multiple other operations. For example, Turkey launched the Operation Black Sea Harmony in 2004 for controlling terrorism and illegal activities in the Black Sea to which all Black Sea countries including Russia participated by 2006. This is also a critical contribution to Black Sea security and an indicator of Turkey's initiative taking and burden sharing capacities. While

Turkey is the key country behind the Operation Black Sea Harmony, it also is a key player in NATO's Mediterranean initiative, Operation Active Endeavour which collects information on sea traffic in the Mediterranean Sea, in particular looking for suspicious activity. Turkey also is a critical player in NATO's Operation Ocean Shield-launched in 2009- for the main purpose of combating piracy in the Indian Ocean. These are in addition to the Turkish decision to host the radar system for NATO's missile defence shield system in Malatya, in order to collect data on suspicious activity in the region. This is particularly important for increasing the Turkish role in dealing with the threat of nuclear proliferation in the region.

Given the active Turkish participation in regional and global security, it would not be far fetched to claim that Turkey is an eager partner in global security governance, indicating strong burden sharing with other such actors. This aspect of Turkey's role as an emerging power became particularly important in the Arab Spring and the subsequent operations in the region. The Arab spring has produced its first military intervention in Libya in 2011. The Libya crisis began when Colonel Gaddafi began to use force against the civilians to repress the uprisings on February 17, 2011. There was a reaction in the UN Security Council to impose sanctions against Libya with the adoption of a resolution on February 26, 2011 and an EU arms embargo was adopted on February 28, 2011. The Arab League asked for a no-fly zone over Libya on March 12, 2011 which the UN Security Council authorized with a resolution on March 23, 2011. The military intervention by NATO countries to the uprising in Libya in 2011, and the subsequent removal of Gaddafi from power turned out to be critical developments for Turkey's involvement. Turkey provided logistical support and non-combat support without directly intervening in the military dimension in the Operations Unified Protector, and it became particularly active after the operation was concluded.

Turkey hosted a meeting for a road map of transition in Libya in April 2011 and tried to negotiate a deal with the Libyan government for democratic reform. When the military operation was over, Turkey became one of the first countries to recognize the Transitional National Government in Libya in July 2011, and allocated 300 million \$ to help the reconstruction efforts immediately. In the Libyan crisis, Turkish role went beyond diplomatic means and since it involved a NATO intervention, Turkey ended up getting involved as well. However, the government was very careful in dissociating itself from unnecessary use of force and stepped in the reconstruction efforts the minute the crisis was over.

It is Syria that is creating the biggest challenge for Turkey's regional aspirations. The ongoing civil war in Syria since March 2011 has created significant tension for Turkey. This is also unfortunate as since 2007, Turkey's relations with Syria were booming. They have agreed on a free trade arrangement, lifted visa requirements, Turkish businesspeople were investing in Syria and diplomatic relations were very friendly and cordial until 2011. However, the escalating violence in the country turned out to be severe with a constant inflow of refugees from Syria coming to Turkey for harbor. As of December 2013, there are more than 500,000 Syrian refugees in Turkey, most of which are sheltered in 17 different camps. Furthermore, the political instability in Syria is diffusing onto the Turkish territory with across the border activity and occasional missiles landing on the Turkish cities in the South. The UN Security Council resolution for an UN intervention was vetoed by Russia and China in 2012. The diplomatic efforts of the Arab League and the EU seemed not to have worked. Thus, in 2013, the Turkish government found itself in the unenviable position to be a front line state for the solution of the Syrian problem, and the worsening crisis in Syria complicated the Turkish role in the region. However, its ability to host officially 500,000 Syrian refugees as well as its consistent stance in the UN on the Syrian issue demonstrated the critical role that Turkey plays in regional security.

The following table summarizes Turkey's contribution to the regional security governance along these four dimensions.

Summary of Turkish role in four dimensions

Security provisions Dimensions	Regional	Global
Prevention	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mediation efforts: Iraq vs Syria 2009 • mediation between Serbia and Kosovo • financial aid to Africa • FDI in the region • hosts 500, 000 Syrian refugees • trade integration 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NATO member since 1952 • OIC member • European Union acceding country • G-20 member • Iran nuclear swap deal 2010 • reform of the UNSC
Protection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • operations in Iraq, Afghanistan • provides education and health services development in the region • reconstruction efforts in the region • significant flow of aid to less developed regions • diplomatic engagement with all the parties in the region 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • official dialogue member with Shangai Cooperation • hosts UNDP headquarters • hosts Black Sea economic cooperation and South East European regional Stability headquarters • reconstruction efforts in Africa, specifically Somalia
Assurance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training Iraqi, Libyan forces • EU civilian operations • democratic model • NATO's civilian representative in Afghanistan is Turkish 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • forces Afghani forces • organizes Diplomacy academy • NATO's partnership for peace training center
Compellance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participate in all EU operations • conduct Operation Black Sea Harmony • NATO operation in Libya • Training Iraqi, Libyan forces 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • participate in UNIFIL • participate in NATO's ISAF • took over Regional Command control • participate Operation Ocean Shield • hosts NATO's radar system • military spending high

Conclusion

This paper analyzed the Turkish role in global affairs as an emerging power, both in terms of its political and economic capabilities, and its increased engagement in the region where it is located. These capabilities enabled Turkey to enhance capacity to prevent, protect, assure and compel in global and regional security constellations. Its recent foreign policy endeavors, especially in the Middle East, brought Turkey into fore front of international relations. Its participation in all EU and NATO operations, its initiatives in global operations, its financial aid flow and increased trade links with its neighbors, all added up to portray an emerging power in regional security governance. However, Turkey's ability to be a regional power depends on its own democratic development. Unless Turkey becomes a fully democratic country with full respect for human rights and individual liberties, its role in influencing its region will remain limited, especially with regards to its assurance capacity. This is particularly important in the democratic transformation and social upheavals in the Arab world as the Turkish credibility as a promoter of democratic values in the Middle East depends on its own image as a democratic state.

That said, it is clear that Turkey emerged as a key player in both global and regional governance constellations. Its military and economic capabilities added up to make Turkey an important contributor to global security governance. Its position in NATO, the UN and its membership in G-20

all added up to enhance Turkey's visibility in multilateral settings, reinforcing its role in global governance. Yet, one needs to note that Turkish provision of security remains in multilateral settings and the government signals a preference to seek limited intergovernmentalism, rather than strengthening regional initiatives that would involve transfer of competencies to another authority.

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